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of 1662 native residents from 15 climato-economically representative provinces across China.
These within-country findings supplement preceding between-country observations in starting to unravel tangled and complex origins of collectivist orientations around the globe.
Climato-Economic Theory of Culture

Axioms: Needs, Demands and Resources
The anthropologic needs axiom postulates that humans as a warm-blooded species have existential needs for thermal comfort, nutrition, and health, as exemplified by their natural inclination to seek residence in temperate climates away from arctics and deserts (Rehdanz & Maddison, 2005; Tavassoli, 2009; Van de Vliert, 2013, in press ).
The climatic demands axiom postulates that colder-than-temperate winters and hotterthan-temperate summers are more demanding to the extent that they deviate from 22 o C (about 72 o F) as a reference point for optimal psychophysiological comfort, abundant nutritional resources of flora and fauna, and healthy living conditions (Fischer & Van de Vliert, 2011;  Collectivism across China 5 Parsons, 2003; Van de Vliert, 2009 ). Greater climatic demands, due to decreasing natural resources, can be compensated for by increasing income resources.
The economic resources axiom postulates that present-day humans use income resources to cope with demanding winters or summers. Liquid cash and illiquid capital can buy a wide variety of climate-compensating goods and services, including clothing, housing, heating and cooling, transportation, meals, and medical cure and care. Articulating the way this is visible in modern human beings, families in richer nations spend up to 50% of their household income on climate-compensating goods and services, a figure that rises over 90% in poorer nations (Parker, 2000, pp. 144-147) .
Demands-Resources Effects
The climato-economic explanation of culture (Van de Vliert 2009 , 2011a , 2013 belongs to a family of demands-resources theories. Across the disciplines of psychology (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997) , sociology (e.g., Ormel, Lindenberg, Steverink, & Vonkorff, 1997) , and the organizational sciences (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Karasek, 1979) , it is widely believed that demands placed on people are a double-edged sword. Greater demands in interaction with insufficient resources to meet the demands increase closed-mindedness and risk aversion, whereas greater demands in interaction with sufficient resources increase open-mindedness and risk seeking. Climato-economic theorizing similarly posits that climatic demands in interaction with poor income resources promote risk avoidance and looking for insurance through collectivistic seclusion and control, whereas climatic demands in interaction with rich income resources promote seeking better expected outcomes through individualistic exploration and creation. In other words, the expected utility of collectivist adaptation is higher in habitats with greater climatic and economic hardships.
The climato-economic theory further proposes that inhabitants of lower-income areas Collectivism across China 6 appraise more demanding winters and summers as threatening and adapt to them by falling back more on their ingroups for setting and achieving goals (collectivist orientation; Van de Vliert, 2011a , 2013 Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012) . Existential threats appear to set in motion processes of culture building in directions of closed-mindedness, ingroup commitment, and ingroup favoritism (Richter & Kruglanski, 2004) . In a similar vein, the parasite-stress theory asserts that avoiding and managing life-threatening infections cultivate ingroup assortive sociality (Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Fincher, Thornhill, Schaller, & Murray, 2008; Schaller & Murray, 2011 ). Gelfand et al. (2011 come closest to our demandsresources notions by arguing and demonstrating that greater environmental threats and a greater dearth of resources promote cultural tightness with clearer norms and stronger sanctions for nonconformity, which are also highly characteristic of collectivist societies (Triandis, 1995) .
The theory finally proposes that inhabitants of higher-income areas appraise more demanding winters and summers as challenging and adapt to them by falling back more on their individual selves for setting and achieving goals (individualist orientation; Van de Vliert, 2011a , 2013 . Only under relatively challenging environmental conditions "can people have a low enough need for closure to venture out on their own into the ambiguous, uncertain, and often risky realm of individualism" (Richter & Kruglanski, 2004, p. 116) . This is the central idea also of the theory that voluntary settlement in challenging frontier regions promotes cultural values and practices of independence and self-reliance rather than collectivism (Kitayama et al., 2006 (Kitayama et al., , 2010 Varnum & Kitayama, 2010) .
Climato-Economic Covariations of Collectivism
Comparative climato-economic studies of collectivism have been done for familism across 57 nations, nepotism across 116 nations, and compatriotism across 73 nations (Van de Vliert, 2011a) . Because the results were highly similar, and because familism, nepotism and Collectivism across China 7 compatriotism were indeed tapping the same underlying construct (Cronbach's α = .89), the analysis was repeated predicting overall collectivism across 121 nations (Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012) . As predicted on the basis of threat appraisals versus challenge appraisals, greater climatic demands were associated with stronger collectivism in lower-income nations (e.g., Kyrgyzstan and Chad) but with weaker collectivism in higher-income nations (e.g., Finland and Bahrain). However, the validity of these findings can be critically questioned on the following grounds.
One critical concern we have is for larger countries (e.g., China, Russia, and the United States) where climatic demands and income resources arguably span several climate and income zones. In addition, living with the nuclear family, nepotism and compatriotism are sociological outcomes rather than psychological manifestations of collectivism, and can be further criticized for assuming measurement equivalence across language boundaries and national borders (see Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) . Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the above cross-national studies is that many alternative explanations of the findings can never be ruled out convincingly because countries differ in numerous characteristics.
Although the potential impacts of parasitic disease burden, state antiquity, language diversity, ethnic heterogeneity, religious fractionalization, and being rooted in Christianity or Islam were statistically excluded (Van de Vliert, 2011a; Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012) , firm conclusions about the origins of geographic variation in collectivism do not yet exist. A replication study within a large country would reduce all of these concerns about averaging out climate and income variations, using sociological indicators, assuming psychometric equivalence, and overlooking alternative explanations.
The Case of China
China was chosen as an appropriate venue to better test the climato-economic covariation of collectivism because it has the climatic feature of large variations in cold winters and hot Collectivism across China 8 summers, and the economic feature of poor areas in the north and the west and fast economic growth in some eastern provinces (The Economist, 2011) . As most Chinese provinces have demanding continental climates and poor populations, overall livability will be appraised as threatening rather than challenging. For inhabitants of those habitats, the theory predicts that greater climatic demands are associated with stronger collectivist orientations in the poorest (henceforth lower-income) areas but that this tendency will be weaker in the moderately poor Achieving a 72.3% response rate, the final sample consisted of 972 males and 690 females working in 20 private-owned enterprises located in 20 towns across the 15 provinces (see Table 1 for details). The average age was 32, ranging from 18 to 65, 64.8% was married, and the average period of tenure was 8.55 years (SD = 8.17). Respondents were highly educated:
53.6% completed high school, 24.8% received higher education of up-to-three years of college, and 26.6% held a bachelor's or higher degree.
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Measures
Individual level: Collectivist orientation. Using the common translation-back-translation procedure, a Chinese 14-item measure of that broad constellation of psychological attributes associated with collectivism was constructed on the basis of previously published instruments and reviews (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis et al., 1986 Triandis et al., , 1993 Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . To minimize acquiescence bias, 2 of the 14 items listed in Table 2 and one-way analysis of variance indicated that cultural collectivism differed much more between provinces than within provinces (F = 8.66, df = 14, p < .001). These coefficients support the aggregation of collectivist orientations at the individual level into distinct estimates of cultural collectivism at the provincial level (see last column in Table 1 ).
Provincial level: Climatic demands. In line with past research (e.g., Van de Vliert, 2009 , 2011a , 2011b , provincial climates are considered more demanding to the extent that Collectivism across China 10 temperatures in the coldest and hottest months deviate from 22°C. Specifically, climatic demands were operationalized as the sum of the four absolute deviations from 22°C for the average lowest and highest temperatures in January and in July (data available for the capital city of each province from http://cdc.cma.gov.cn). In Heilongjiang, for example, the average temperature ranges from -24.6°C to -13.0°C in January, and from 18.0°C and 27.7°C in July, Table 1 for the approximately normally distributed measures of climatic demands).
There is no indication that the 15 provinces sampled do not represent all province-level regions with respect to the lowest (t = 0.01, ns) and highest (t = 0.18, ns) temperatures in January, and the lowest (t = 0.20, ns) and highest (t = 0.44, ns) temperatures in July. Nor is there any empirical indication that somewhat lower or higher reference points than 22°C lead to other results. ), and for the percentage of minorities, because both of these living conditions press "toward tightness and a need for coordination, hence collectivism."
Results
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Zero-Order Correlations
The well-documented tendency among Europeans and Americans that older people are more collectivist than younger people (for an overview, see Triandis, 2009) , is replicated among Chinese individuals (see Table 3 ). Also, the cross-national observation that cultural collectivism is stronger in lower-income populations (Hofstede, 2001; Van de Vliert, 2011a) , is replicated across Chinese provinces. Table 3 additionally shows that population density and percentage of minorities have negligible associations with cultural collectivism. By contrast, climatic demands and cultural collectivism are so strongly entwined (r = .80, n = 15, p < .001), that we first explored whether income resources can have any statistical effect on cultural collectivism over and above the extremely strong impact of climatic demands.
Insert Table 3 about here
Preliminary Analysis
We ran a regression analysis with standardized predictors at the provincial level to inspect both additive and interactive effects of climatic and economic hardships on Table 4 for detailed results).
Insert Table 4 about here
Supplementary Analysis
The above analyses neglect the "psychological geography" (Rentfrow, in press) of Chinese collectivism by neglecting the couplings between collectivist orientations and provincial locations. Cultural orientations and geographic locations can be coupled in descriptive and predictive ways (Lobao, Hooks, & Tickamyer, 2007; Van de Vliert, 2011a , 2013 These considerations of sample representativeness, measurement reliability, and predictive accuracy provided methodological grounds for predicting the strength of cultural collectivism in 31 province-level regions across China. Table 5 reports the 31 estimated baseline scores in descending order, the regression equation on which they are based, and the 15 observed baseline scores with which they may be compared. Further emphasizing the accuracy of the prediction model, visual inspection reveals that the predicted and the observed baselines in the sample provinces are almost identical (r = .89, n = 15, p < .001). The display of regional patterns of cultural collectivism in Figure 2 shows that collectivist orientations tend to be weakest in the south, moderately weak to moderately strong in China's heartlands, and strongest in the north.
Insert Table 5 and Figure First, climato-economic imprints on Chinese collectivism reduce criticisms of crossnational support for climato-economic theorizing. These criticisms concern measurement errors in averages for large countries, sociological indicators of collectivism, and psychometric equivalence across distinct populations. There are also fewer confounding variables affecting cross-provincial findings than confounding variables affecting crossnational findings. Second, no preceding research has provided such a stringent and conservative test of the climato-economic theory of collectivist culture within a carefully sampled geographic area. Third, this is the first study ever to compare climato-economic impacts on individual-level collectivist orientation and higher-level collectivist culture. The finding that collectivism at the provincial level fully mediates the interactive impact of climatic and economic hardships on collectivist orientation at the individual level suggests that culture building is a collective process. Apparently, exposed to the same winters, summers, and financial standard of living, populations are gradually pushing and pulling every member toward a shared culture-a top-down rather than bottom-up process.
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Chinese collectivism is often traced back to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Bond & Hwang, 2008; Li, 1986; Nisbett, 2003) . There is little doubt that these philosophicalreligious traditions have influenced stresses, goals, means, and outcomes in contemporaneous China. Additionally, it is also likely that Chinese are no exception to the rule that millennialong evolution of collectivist culture in humans, just like evolution in animals and plants, has climatic underpinnings ( Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012) . So perhaps it should have come as no surprise that we discovered climate-collectivism links, that collectivism at the provincial level and through it collectivist orientations at the individual level are positively associated with climatic demands. However, these climate-collectivism links are influenced by the financial standard of living: collectivism is weakest in provinces with temperate climates irrespective of income (e.g., Guangdong), negligibly stronger in higher-income provinces with demanding climates (e.g., Hunan), and strongest in lower-income provinces with demanding climates (e.g., Heilongjiang).
Theoretical consolidation: Population density. "When the number of people per unit of area is large, people have to develop many rules for social behavior to reduce the probability of conflict … Population density presses toward tightness, hence collectivism" (Triandis, 1995, pp. 58, 100) . The evidence for this hypothesis is becoming stronger and stronger. Crossnationally, societies with higher population density are tighter and more collectivist (Gelfand et al., 2011) . Similarly, within the United States, higher density of population, which should not be confused with greater urbanism, is associated with stronger collectivism (Vandello & Cohen, 1999) . Our study now adds that Chinese subpopulations, too, are more collectivist in more densily populated areas. All in all, the positive link between population density and cultural collectivism robustly holds across nations (Gelfand et al, 2011) , across regions within a relatively rich country, which is home to the largest individualist civilization on earth Collectivism across China 16 (Vandello & Cohen, 1999) , and across regions within a relatively poor country, which is home to the largest collectivist civilization on earth (this study).
Theoretical application: Percentage of minorities. While we defined collectivists on the basis of the importance attached to the boundaries between ingroups and outgroups, so far we highlighted membership of ingroups, leaving non-membership of outgroups in the background. This one-sided emphasis, however, ignores the fact that the climato-economic theory of culture can be used to further clarify the causal order of ingroup loyalty and outgroup antagonism in explaining intergroup conflict. "Findings from both cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments" now seem to support the hypothesis "that much ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination is motivated by preferential treatment of ingroup members rather than direct hostility toward outgroup members" (Brewer, 1999, p. 429; see also Brewer & Chen, 2007) . If negative outgroup discrimination is, in many cases, an epiphenomenon of positive ingroup discrimination, it follows that a better understanding of intergroup conflict, and especially of interethnic violence in China, must be primarily sought in ultimate sources of ingroup loyalty. Theoretical generalization. Because the explanation of collectivism in terms of climatic demands and income resources belongs to a family of demands-resources theories, as outlined above, it is pertinent to also ask to what extent the present findings reflect a more general reality. Is the mechanism of meeting environmental demands through using income resources generalizable from threatening winters and summers to other threatening circumstances? Moving us further beyond single-factor determinism, it may be an innovative avenue for future research to examine whether there are social-psychological adaptations to interactions of income and demandingness of, for example, natural disasters, food deprivation, disease prevalence, population density, domestic political violence, or territorial threats from neighboring nations. If the climato-economic explanation of collectivism survives tests against these alternative demands-resources interactions, one next question is how climatoeconomic habitats are related to evolutionary processes.
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Evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Baumeister, 2005; Buss, 2005; Plotkin, 2002; Yamagishi, 2011) may read the empirical results reported here as extra evidence for the validity of models of biotic niche construction within predominantly abiotic habitats. Cash and capital were gradually constructed as ingenious tools that exist independently of place, time, and items they can buy. In turn, these tools are now intensively used to collectively shape the environment by altering direct and indirect impacts of adverse winters and summers on meeting shared existential needs. All of these niche-construction activities lead to new feedback cycles and become the basis for continuous further adaptation, including gradual moves from collectivist to individualist orientations.
Methodological Considerations
The strength of conservative testing of climato-economic imprints on collectivism in the 
Likely Changes in China
Our measures and messages are not about global warming, nor about culture change.
Nevertheless, the climato-economic covariations of collectivism found may be bound to have implications for the cultural consequences of global warming in the long run, which charges us with the ethical obligation to mention these implications (Swim et al., 2011; . On the basis of data generated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cline (2007) has forecasted temperature changes in China's seven climatic subzones Collectivism across China 19 between the end of the 20th century and the end of the 21st century .
His global warming projections, broken down for winter months and summer months, imply that climatic demands will decrease all over China, but especially in a diagonal slice of provinces and counties stretching from the Tibetan plateau in the southwest through Central
China to Heilongjiang in the northeast.
Thus, during the current century, climatic demands are expected to decrease relatively strongly for Chinese living in regions with continental climates where collectivism is still relatively strong (cf. Figure 2) . To the extent that our findings, pictured in Figure 1 , reflect causality rather than cross-sectional simultaneity, especially collectivism around this southwest-northeast diagonal is bound to weaken in times to come. Figure 1 also suggests that economic growth will reinforce the link between weakening climatic demands and weakening collectivism. Indeed, the present findings propose, at least for China to begin with, that decreases in climato-economic hardships and decreases in collectivism are in flux together. 
